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Consumer Electronics Industry 
 
 
Abstract and Key Results 
• Outsourcing has gained much prominence in managerial practice and academic discussions in 
the last two decades or so.  Yet, we still do not understand the full implications of outsourcing strategy 
for corporate performance.  Traditionally outsourcing across borders is explained as a cost-cutting 
exercise, but more recently the core competency argument states that outsourcing also leads to an 
increased focus, thereby improving effectiveness.  However, no general explanation has so far been 
provided for how outsourcing could lead to deterioration in a firm‟s competence base. We 
longitudinally analyze three cases of major consumer electronics manufacturers, Emerson Radio from 
the U.S., Japan‟s Sony and Philips from the Netherlands to understand the dynamic process related to 
their sourcing strategies.  We develop an evolutionary stage model that relates outsourcing to 
competence development inside the firm and shows that a vicious cycle may emerge. Thus it is 
appropriate to look not only at how outsourcing is influenced by an organization‟s current set of 
competences, but also how it alters that set over time.  The four stages of the model are offshore 
sourcing, phasing out, increasing dependence on foreign suppliers, and finally industry exit or 
outsourcing reduction. The evolutionary stage model helps managers understand for which activities 
and under which conditions outsourcing across borders is not a viable option. 
• Results suggest that each of these firms had faced a loss of manufacturing competitiveness in 
its home country, to which it responded by offshoring and then outsourcing production. When a loss of 
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Offshoring and outsourcing remain high on managerial agendas, although the type of sourcing that 
grabs most headlines and managerial attention tends to change fairly rapidly.  In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s global sourcing of components and products was seen as a key trend among manufacturing 
firms. The mid-1990s saw corporations farm out information technology activities on a large scale. 
Currently major trends are business process outsourcing to countries like India and South Africa and 
the continuing shift of manufacturing activities to China. The latter types of offshoring and outsourcing 
are not only highly contentious politically but also pose managerial dilemmas.
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Until quite recently it was generally accepted that outsourcing, and especially outsourcing 
across borders, was primarily implemented to cut costs in order to maintain competitiveness.  An 
argument commonly used by decision-makers and academic writers alike is that outsourcing, the 
reliance on external suppliers for the delivery of components and entire products, leads to an increased 
focus on remaining activities (Quinn 1999).  By keeping in-house a more limited number of activities, 
managers can devote more attention to maintaining a world-class level in those activities. Because 
(foreign) suppliers likewise target their efforts, it is possible to obtain specialized help from outside 
suppliers with much lower production costs, so the argument goes.  Of course, these lower production 
costs are at least partly offset by higher transaction costs, because of the difficulties associated with 
sourcing across borders (Mol/van Tulder/Beije 2005). This comparative cost approach is relatively 
well understood and has been widely implemented by practitioners, although firms often fail to take 
into account the true total costs of ownership in make-or-buy and offshoring decisions, as we 
demonstrate in this paper.  The disadvantage of this approach is that it is relatively static. 
In recent years a second argument has therefore been added to sway managers toward 
outsourcing. Outsourcing can be a means of accessing supplier competences that would otherwise 
remain inaccessible, or it can even serve as the gateway to the creation of competences that reside in 
the relationship between the firm and its supplier (Dyer/Singh 1998).  Toyota, for instance, has been 
able to distill a competitive edge from long-term and intimate relations with suppliers like 
Nippondenso.  Thus one might argue that the effects of outsourcing on the acquisition of competences 
have now come to the fore in managerial practice and academic literature.  Outsourcing can be a 
source of both cost savings and competence acquisition. 
Like in the popular press, much of the outsourcing literature is focused on its immediate impact 
in the form of potential cost savings. For the simplest forms of outsourcing (e.g., those involving 
procurement of commodity goods and services), this makes sense as an outsourcing decision will have 
no implications beyond the current bookkeeping period. Where more complicated forms of 
outsourcing are concerned, this is normally not the case.  For instance, it took the U.K. government and 
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Network Rail ten years and several deadly incidents to reconsider the outsourcing of maintenance that 
accompanied the privatization of the railroads (Economist 2005).  At the heart of these problems was 
the gradual erosion of knowledge on the technical state of the railways and a lack of technological 
investments that could have helped detect impending failures. 
But any understanding of the long-run consequences of outsourcing should also include how it 
could affect a firm‟s ability to maintain appropriate skill levels and upgrade its competitive position, 
not just cut costs in the short run. This is much less well-understood and a less popular route of 
scholarly investigation. It has been noted that the long-run consequences of outsourcing are sometimes 
not particularly comforting (Bettis/Bradley/Hamel 1992, Doig/Ritter/Speckhals/Woolson 2001, Kotabe 
1998). However, no general explanation has so far been provided for how outsourcing could lead to 
deterioration in a firm‟s competence base. Therefore we ask the question „how does outsourcing affect 
competences?‟  By doing so we reverse the questions that various authors (e.g. Barney 1999, Quinn 
1999) have addressed.  
Researchers often focus on comparing the current governance costs of in-house production with 
those of external offerings. Transaction cost economics argues that outsourcing levels ought to be the 
results of levels of asset specificity, business uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions 
(Leiblein/Reuer/Dalsace 2002, Williamson 1985). This approach has obvious merits for its simplicity 
and its ability to correctly predict the governance structure of many transactions. It has also been 
argued, however, that there is a range of transactions for which it is not particularly apt (Barney 1999). 
Barney (1999) argues that transaction cost arguments are too static to cope with more dynamic 
industries, especially those with blurred industry boundaries. Transaction cost economics focuses on 
current transaction characteristics but if important future learning and change can occur, current 
governance costs may not be a proper predictor for future governance costs and optimal outsourcing 
choices.   
Such shifts can occur in technologically uncertain and intensive industries, such as the 
electronics industry.  In fact, we would argue that this is exactly what has been happening in the 
electronics industry over the past few decades. Firms have had to face major technological shifts, such 
as that from analog to digital technology. They also faced stiff global competition and business cycles, 
for instance, in consumer electronics (CE) and semiconductors. For this type of industry additional 
analytical tools may be required that incorporate long-term change into viability assessments on 
outsourcing.  So far empirical investigations on the effects of outsourcing over longer time periods are 
scarce (with some exceptions, like the semi-longitudinal study of D'Aveni/Ravenscraft 1994). Also 
relatively sparse are discussions of forms of international outsourcing, as much published work seems 
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to be focused on single countries and treats outsourcing as either a strictly domestic issue or is agnostic 
as to outsourcing locations. We seek to address both issues, broadly asking the question how changes 
in outsourcing levels and locations change competence development inside the firm. 
We longitudinally analyze and compare the cases of three major electronics manufacturers, 
Emerson Radio from the U.S., Japan‟s Sony and Philips from the Netherlands, focusing particularly on 
how these firms changed their sourcing strategies over time. Using these cases we then construct a 
stage model that relates offshoring and outsourcing to competence development inside the firm and 
shows that a vicious cycle may emerge. We describe the specific conditions under which such a cycle 
comes into existence, especially the loss of competitiveness in manufacturing in firms‟ home bases. 
The stage model helps managers to understand for which activities and under which conditions 
outsourcing is not a viable option. 
 
Methodology: Content Analysis 
Because this research question includes a longitudinal element, it cannot be adequately captured by 
survey or cross-sectional research. Therefore, we used content analysis of news articles, company 
documents, industry trends, books and other published reports as well as personal interviews pertaining 
to the CE industry in general and our three firms in particular. We focused on our three firms mainly 
because our initial review of the data documents revealed that the stages cycle emerged most 
conspicuously in these firms. Also, in order to keep our cases clear and discrete, we restricted our 
analysis only to these firms. The fact that all three firms hail from different parts of the Triad, allows 
us to capture different development paths in their home country electronics industries.  
The time period ranged from 1954 to 2007 and we reviewed the content from around fifty 
different sources. Where possible, we were able to compare different reports of the same firm 
information or event as recounted by various reporters. We also compared what was reported against 
interviews on outsourcing we held with electronic firms (not reported here) and against what other 
authors have written about outsourcing and subcontracting in the electronics industry (Kenney/ 
Florida, 1995). An in-depth analysis of our sources suggested that there was a similar pattern in the 
histories and behavior of all three firms over time even though the timing (actual years) did not 
correspond for the firms. Emerson Radio (U.S.) for example, went through its outsourcing experiences 
much earlier than Philips and especially Sony. 
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Global Consumer Electronics Industry 
No explanation of consumer electronics firms is complete without a brief introduction to the dynamics 
underlying the industry in the years when the specter of global competition first appeared. The 
worldwide CE industry has seen much international competition since the 1950s. The Western world 
dominated the field of CE until this time and the 1950s witnessed the advent of the Japanese 
competition, which began with the export of transistors.  Soon, Japanese CE firms such as Sony, 
Matsushita, and others became a force to reckon with.  In particular, rivalry in television technology 
was the most intense in the 1970s. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when global competition became so 
fierce among firms in the Triad region.  But, in 1951, when MITI (Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry, Japan) permitted Japanese companies to enter into licensing agreements for television 
technology with foreign firms, several Japanese companies signed pacts with U.S. companies, such as 
RCA.  At the time, MITI expected to receive only a few applications for approval but it ended up 
authorizing around thirty-seven applications (Partner 1999).  As electrical goods rapidly permeated 
Japanese society, local companies grew larger and developed a competitive edge based on a quick 
learning process and low labor costs. 
U.S. companies, such as Emerson Radio, RCA, Zenith and Magnavox also realized that they 
could gain cost-based competitive advantage by subcontracting assembly and later on manufacturing 
operations to their Asian partners at lower costs. Hence, around the 1960s and 1970s, outsourcing 
became popular with many U.S. firms. In subsequent years, Japanese CE firms acquired technology 
from U.S. companies, gained technological competency and launched new technologically advanced 
products derived from their own R&D. Competition between U.S. firms and their Japanese 
counterparts heated up when Japanese firms entered the U.S. domestic market and began selling their 
products at lower prices. This led U.S. firms to charge dumping allegations against the Japanese firms. 
The developments in the industry that followed show that U.S. companies rapidly increased 
outsourcing and in turn their dependence on their Japanese partners first for radios and later on for 
television sets.  By the end of the 1960s, there were no U.S. radio manufacturers left in the United 
States (Partner 1999). 
A discussion of the European CE industry is mostly an account of Philips and its activities. 
There was probably only one other company, Thomson of France, that was as active in the industry, 
more so than firms such as Siemens and Telefunken.  Like some U.S. firms (National Union Electric, 
Zenith), European firms felt threatened by Japanese competition in the CE industry. Prompted by a 
turbulent environment post the 1970s and lobbying for protection from non-European rivals by 
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influential firms like Philips, Europe implemented new policies. European CE firms were also granted 
subsidies. Especially in the 1980s, the EU stepped in to defend its CE firms from Japanese penetration 
of its markets. Nevertheless, the European CE industry went through a series of restructurings into the 
1990s like the major turnaround operation „Centurion‟ at Philips.  
To illustrate the intensity of rivalry and firms‟ attempts to outdo each other through innovation 
and imitation, let us take this example. As the story goes, in 1963, Philips gave the world the 
audiocassette, which was a noise reduction innovation because Philips eliminated the background tape 
sound. Based on this product, in 1964, a Sony employee proposed the idea of a videocassette.  Finally, 
by 1976, Sony introduced its Betamax VCR in the U.S.  Late 1977 RCA launched its VHS 
SelectaVision VCR format that was made by Matsushita. This product was an improvement on Sony‟s 
Betamax, which could record for only an hour.  Thus, an innovation/product introduction by one firm 
was very quickly followed by the creation of another entrant which sought to gain market share. We 
historically examine the corporate strategies, trials and tribulations of three companies, Emerson Radio 
(U.S.), Royal Philips Electronics (The Netherlands-Europe), and Sony Corp. (Japan) in the field of CE. 
We focus on firm decisions related to entertainment products groups, namely audio, video and 
television products in these companies. Every product introduction built on and upgraded previous 
technology. The three companies in our sample have slightly and sometimes even drastically changed 
their corporate strategies innumerable times in the last 30-40 years.  We focus on those strategies that 
are relevant to outsourcing. 
 All three firms, Emerson Radio, Philips and Sony were technological pioneers at some point in 
the early days of CE. While Emerson Radio discovered a way to retain its market share by supplying 
CE products at low prices, Philips “became Europe‟s core consumer electronics learning base” and 
Sony revolutionized the industry with its miniaturization of CE products (Chandler 2001, p. 221). So, 
how did these firms acquire technological competences? And how did these firms start losing their 
technical prowess?  
 
Overview of Three Companies 
Emerson Radio (U.S.).  From pioneer and maker of CE products to distributor recites the Emerson 
Radio saga in a sentence. The company‟s history is complex because it changed ownership a few 
times. Emerson Radio & Phonograph, as the company was originally called by its founder Max 
Abrams in 1922, mass-produced radios around the time of World War II.  Its radios were known to be 
very modern for their time and decorative in appearance.  It also manufactured phonographs and TVs.  
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In 1965, it was taken over by National Union Corp. (NUC)
2
 and in 1975 Major Corp (a phonograph 
manufacturer founded in 1956) bought its brand name for CE from NUC and changed its own name to 
Emerson Radio. 
 Emerson Radio obtained technology mainly through its own efforts and through acquisitions. 
Soon after entering the radio business, the company introduced the first radio-phonograph combination 
sold in the U.S.  In 1932, it launched its popular miniature radio, which was around 8 ½ inches by 6 ¼ 
inches wide, and Emerson Radio was the leader in the manufacture and sale of miniature radios. By 
1938, it had sold over 1 million of these radios. Years before Japan‟s Sony became famous for 
miniaturization of CE products, Emerson Radio introduced the tiniest radio to date in 1954, which 
measured 3½ x 3 x ¾ inches. This achievement made Emerson Radio the largest producer of tiny 
radios in the world.  It was so technologically advanced in the 1950s that it planned to “build a radio, 
using transistors instead of tubes, so small that it can be worn like a wrist watch” (Forbes 1954, p. 22).  
After World War II, it introduced one of the first television sets in the U.S., and this caused earnings to 
more than double by the mid-1950s. Emerson Radio also had R&D labs in the U.S.  By this time, 
Emerson Radio had a solid brand name and superior technological capabilities, and attempted to 
capture nearby markets, mainly in Canada and Latin America.  However, as more players entered the 
emerging television industry, competition at home grew and Emerson started cutting the price of its 
television sets in order to survive in the market.  It is around this time when the company realized that 
it needed to take drastic measures to subsist in the industry and it did (explained in the following 
section).  In 1953, Emerson Radio launched the first compatible color-TV receiver and, in 1958, it 
acquired further technological capabilities when it bought CE inventor DuMont‟s television sets, 
phonograph and high-fidelity stereo equipment operations. By the early 1960s Emerson Radio had 
developed production capabilities complemented by a strong brand name in CE. But even then, in the 
battle for market share and the onslaught of foreign CE firms, U.S. producers like Emerson Radio were 
fast losing market share.  In the latter half of the 1960s, although American companies such as RCA, 
Westinghouse Electric, Admiral and General Electric were struggling to make profits and hang on to 
their businesses, Emerson managed to continue making a profit (New York Times 1981).  Emerson 
built a large customer base and acquired a significant portion of the market by eventually setting up 
cost-efficient manufacturing operations in East Asia to deliver electronic products at reasonable prices 
to middle-class American citizens. It was indeed one of the very first U.S. companies to popularize 
such manufacturing strategies. In the short run profitability grew but in the long run it faced several 
problems due to excessive outsourcing.  
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Philips Electronics (The Netherlands).  Philips was established in the Netherlands in 1912, and 
grew to be the largest European CE company and one of the largest in the world.  Its main activity was 
electrical lighting, but it acquired a leading position in CE before the mid-1970s when Japanese 
companies entered Europe.  Right from the time it was set up, Philips was based on R&D and 
developed its own technologies and mostly kept R&D in-house in various labs across Europe.  This 
enabled it to increase its own product portfolio from the 1920s. However, during World War II, several 
of its European operations were destroyed.  Postwar Philips enhanced its technical capabilities by 
relying on color TV technology licensed from RCA like most of the Japanese CE firms in the 1970s.  
At the same time, Philips‟s research efforts proved to be beneficial for Japan‟s Matsushita because 
Philips owned 35 percent of Matsushita, which depended on Philips‟s R&D.  Philips entered into 
collaborations and joint ventures for innovation and new product development in the 1980s.  Its most 
successful collaboration was with Sony to launch the compact disc system.  However, by the late 
1990s, Philips had lost its once superior technological capabilities.  
 
Sony Corporation (Japan).  Although Sony did not invent the transistor, it was the first company 
to launch the transistor radio and this innovative feat played a major role in Sony‟s emergence as a 
technological leader (Partner 1999).  Founded in 1953, Tokyo Tsushin, as the company was originally 
called before its name was changed to Sony, quickly built a reputation for itself in Japan and soon in 
the rest of the world.  In 1953, Sony signed a pact with U.S.-based Western Electric to learn its 
transistor technology and then conducted its own research on radios.  In 1955, Sony introduced its first 
transistor radio, TR-55, in the market. Just like Sony, other U.S. and Japanese manufacturers had 
developed their versions of the transistor radio around the same time and sold those in the U.S. market.  
But, in the international arena, Sony had to compete not only with other Japanese contenders but also 
with the U.S. and European ones, which already had brand equity and established distribution 
networks.  In 1982, Sony introduced the TV Walkman, a technological breakthrough in those days. 
Throughout this era, Sony, like most other Japanese companies relied on in-house R&D, continually 
increasing R&D spending over the years, for instance, by 9.6 percent in 1983 to $90.6 million.  Sony, 
like most other Japanese CE firms, initially followed a conservative policy by keeping R&D in-house, 
but eventually gave in to financial concerns (brought about by an inability to meet high demand and 
fierce rivalry) and resorted to outsourcing.  Hence, the 1990s saw “a shift from a technology-based 
company to a product-based company” in the words of Kutaragi, President of Sony Computer 
Entertainment Corp (Nikkei Weekly 2003). In the next section we examine the dynamic shifts, in four 
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different stages, in the sourcing strategies employed by Emerson, Philips, and Sony. Table 1 contains a 
summary.  
___________________________ 
Place Table 1 about here 
___________________________ 
 
Stages over time 
Stage 1: Offshore Sourcing (Setting up a Foreign Subsidiary in Low-cost Locations) 
Before plunging headlong into the establishment of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries, CE firms 
dabbled in foreign transactions. After Emerson faced trouble selling its television sets amid tough 
competition and after trying out the price-cut strategy, the company found another way to increase 
profits – by lowering costs.  In 1956 sales fell from over $87 million to $74 million while earnings 
were a meager $84,850.  Then the company moved further to set up cost-efficient manufacturing 
operations in East Asia in the 1960s. 
Philips, on the other hand, had been collaborating with foreign companies, starting in 1916 with 
General Electric, to exchange technical know-how and experience. Although the company had been 
engaged in foreign trade activities, foreign investment were not established until in the 1920s.  Philips 
moved many of its production plants out of the Netherlands to avoid high tariffs leaving behind 
unemployed people.  This was the first time it set up offshore production.  In the following years, 
Philips closed down some more plants in the Netherlands. It followed an aggressive expansionist 
policy in the next decade and set up several subsidiaries in different parts of the world.  By the late 
1960s, Philips had manufacturing operations in several parts of the world including Singapore, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Kenya, and also Algeria in the early 1970s.  Almost all of these places were 
low-cost locations.  In 1968, the company‟s profits rose by 10 percent.  Philips set up operations in 
low-cost Taiwan (1970), where it began production of monochrome picture tubes (by 1989, this 
facility had become the world‟s largest tube manufacturer and Philips had a total of 5 plants in 
Taiwan).  In 1974, the company discontinued its non-color picture tube production in the United 
Kingdom and moved production to low-cost locations.  Around this time CE companies the world over 
were involved in similar moves to low-cost regions for manufacturing.  By 1974, Philips already had 
TV and audio plants in Singapore, a black & white TV plant in Taiwan, a stereo plant in Brazil and an 
electronics production plant in South Korea.   
Philips suffered a setback in profits in the fourth quarter of 1975.  This was also a turning point 
for Philips as it faced tough competition from the Japanese companies. Philips‟s video technology, 
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V2000, was in direct competition with Beta and VHS, i.e., the Japanese VCR systems. By the end of 
the 1970s, the Japanese companies had entered Europe and formed partnerships and collaborations and 
this helped them gain a foothold and market share in Europe. Although the V2000 format developed 
by Philips was technologically superior to the Japanese VCR systems, the V2000 system failed partly 
due to Philips‟s inability to find partners (Dai 1996). This was the beginning of the collaborative era 
for Philips during which it went on an alliance spree and partnered with several foreign firms. Philips 
increased its presence in Japan by buying a stake in Japan‟s Marantz in 1980 from U.S.-based 
Superscope that owned a majority stake in the company.  Marantz, then owned by Philips, soon 
became its base in Japan for the production of goods at low costs.  Hence, as time went by, Philips, like 
other CE firms had spread itself over several low cost regions, which enabled it to compete more 
efficiently in the industry.  
Sony set up its first foreign production plant, Champagne Plant, in 1959 in Hong Kong.  It was 
a transistor radio assembly plant through a local firm that provided all the capital and managed the 
business.  It was only a contractual agreement for production.  Goods at this plant (mainly assembled 
transistor radios) were then sent to Europe, Australia, Canada and other areas. However, Sony already 
shut down the plant in 1961 due to some undisclosed „disagreement‟ with the local firm, making for an 
unsuccessful first move abroad.  Compared to most U.S. firms, Sony moved operations abroad much 
later.  Competition in the industry compelled it to set up several foreign plants in the 1970s.  In 1973, 
Sony formed Sony do Brazil.  In the same year, Sony also denied reports that it would second source 
products from National Semicon.  By 1973, Sony was manufacturing radios, black and white TVs and 
tape recorders in its Sony Korea subsidiary.  It also formed a joint venture with a Korean partner, 
Hwasin Industries, for production of color TVs. Following a drop in overall sales, Sony reorganized its 
distribution network. Other foreign subsidiaries set up in the 1970s and 1980s include audio 
manufacturing subsidiary, Sony da Amazonia, in Brazil, a VCR factory in Taiwan, a VHS plant in 
Malaysia, an audio tape manufacturing subsidiary Magneticos de Mexico, a joint venture with 
Motoradio, Sony Videobras for video tape manufacturing and several others worldwide. It also 
established Sony Precision Engineering Center in Singapore to manufacture optical pickups for CD 
players and joint production of CE products with a Chinese trading firm.  Most of these offshore plants 
were in low-cost locations and involved joint production with local partners. 
Until the late 1980s, Sony kept R&D in Japan.  By 1988, Sony had considerably increased 
offshore production. The company claimed that the appreciation of the yen prompted it to expand 
overseas production because this made it less profitable to manufacture goods in Japan.  In the 1980s 
around 20 percent of Sony‟s production was undertaken by its foreign plants and it felt the need to 
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further increase manufacturing overseas. Sony aimed to develop its Asian plants as supply centers for 
high-technology products. The company hoped that it would achieve at least 35 percent of 
manufacturing outside of Japan in the 1990s.  Thus, it moved toward increasing offshore production in 
the 1980s. But, in 1985, Sony announced that it would start shifting focus from CE to business 
customers in response to a fall in profits.  It also started setting up regional R&D and engineering 
centers in 1989 such as Advanced Video Technology Center (AVTC), the development base for 
HDTV in San Jose in the U.S.  By the first half of the 1990s, Sony had over twenty R&D centers 
outside Japan.  
All three firms perceived the need to lower manufacturing costs, and Philips and Sony 
responded to this need by setting up plants in low cost locations as did their industry rivals.  Emerson 
seemed to opt directly for sourcing components and then final products from overseas manufacturers, 
which were low cost producers. CE firms often followed each other to low cost destinations in Asia, 
thereby overturning each other‟s temporary gains and then re-entering the race to reduce costs even 
further.  Nevertheless, this opening move to low cost regions seemed to be successful as profits rose 
initially in all three cases.  The relentless pursuit of advanced technologies, however, soon prompted 
CE firms to reduce costs even further, which characterizes Stage 2 of our model.  
 
Stage 2: Phasing Out (Transferring Production to Independent Operators) 
U.S.-based Emerson Radio moved through the stages of the model we will conceptualize later much 
faster than the other two firms.  After the takeover by NUC, Emerson Radio continued to produce 
television sets and other CE products.  However, sales were low and profits remained elusive. Emerson 
Radio began operating in the red under NUC, with the problem apparently too little volume to cover 
fixed costs.  Between 1967 and 1971 the division lost about $27 million.  In order to reduce fixed 
costs, NUC outsourced manufacturing of Emerson Radio‟s CE products to U.S.-based Admiral Corp.  
Under the pact, Emerson Radio was in charge of designing, engineering, and marketing. At the same 
time, Emerson also imported home entertainment products and some other CE goods from East Asian 
manufacturers.  However in 1973, Admiral terminated its contract with Emerson Radio, which was 
thereafter dependent almost entirely on Asian OEMers (original equipment manufacturers) for its 
products.  
Philips went through its own share of problems and after profits took a beating in 1975, it was 
encouraged to further lower its fixed cost levels by increasing its reliance on offshore manufacturers.  
The company continued to phase out production in higher cost locations such as its color TV 
manufacturing plant in Canada and moved further production offshore.  In 1981, it set up its seventh 
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factory in Singapore for the production of radios and increased its investment in product development 
and automation in Singapore and also set up an audio equipment plant in China in 1985.   
In 1980, Philips restructured its organization. The V2000 debacle had hit Philips hard.  Until 
then, it was a prosperous organization but after the V2000 case, profitability fell.  At the time, it 
introduced its make-or-buy policy.  Under this new policy, the company withdrew itself from certain 
industries such as military and defense.  The company that was managed thus far as locally responsive 
in its various markets started moving toward globalizing its businesses, divesting itself of non-core 
operations and entering joint ventures for production.  In the later 1980s, Philips‟s Chairman-CEO at 
the time clarified the new direction of the company by stating, “On a world scale, you must be 
selective and stick to what you can do best” (TV Digest 1988, p. 10).  It also sold its white goods unit 
to Whirlpool and its minicomputers unit to Digital Equipment.  Under its agreement with Whirlpool, 
Whirlpool was to own 53 percent of the joint venture with Philips, but soon Whirlpool bought out 
Philips‟s stake in the company. Philips continued to sell white goods until the 1990s when it 
disengaged itself from the business entirely. In 1981, Philips spun off its electronics parts subsidiary 
Cambridge and in a series of sales a few years later, sold two more electronics component units to 
Cambridge Electronics Industries. In 1981 Sanyo acquired Philips‟s U.K. color TV production plant to 
sell its own color TV sets.  In 1983, after the failure of its V2000, Philips bought VHS models from 
Matsushita in Japan and sold them in Australia and New Zealand.  NAP (North American Philips, 
Philips‟s U.S. subsidiary) on the other hand, purchased TV sets from Matsushita for sale under the 
Magnavox, Philco and Sylvania brands in the United States.  Japan‟s Pioneer was also supplying 
consumer disc players to NAP.  Matsushita also supplied VCRs to be sold under the Magnavox brand 
name in the United States. Thus NAP was entirely dependent on products supplied by Japanese 
companies. 
What is notable about Philips‟s strategies is its proclivity to form joint ventures.  After 1980s, 
the company ended up with many pacts with foreign CE companies for joint production or R&D in 
Asia.  Significant examples of these are joint production of VHS recorders in South Korea with local 
Dong Won Electronics and the venture for compact disc players with Shenzhen Shen Fei Laser of 
China. These enabled the partner in the venture to learn from more technologically advanced Philips.  
Philips gradually increased reliance on these partners and in many cases the partners finally took over 
operations from Philips.  Philips had a videodisc laser optics factory in Shenzhen, China, and it also 
formed a partnership with China‟s Shenzhen Advanced Science and Technology Development 
Company to produce cassettes for Philips in the 1980s.  The output was to be used for the Chinese 
market as well as different world markets.  By the end of 1989, Philips had increased its dependence 
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on this plant and begun manufacturing CD boom boxes, laserdisc players and optical discs. This 50-50 
joint venture with Shenzhen used Philips‟s equipment worth $40 million and also employees and 
technicians trained by Philips.  In 2001, Philips reduced its share in the joint venture.  But by this time, 
the Chinese partner had ample opportunity to acquire knowledge about Philips‟s technology.  Philips 
also had a 20 percent stake in a VCR and other components production plant in Czechoslovakia. 
Philips was providing this plant with production facilities, know-how, information systems and 
employee training, all forms of tacit knowledge.  
Other divestments include the sale of Philips‟s 35 percent stake in Matsushita3 to Matsushita‟s 
parent company which had by then learned most of Philips‟s technologies and product development 
capabilities in CE products, the sale of its manufacturing division in South Korea to South Korean 
investors, and the sale of plants that were manufacturing television and audio equipment in Singapore 
and Brazil in 1998.  As recently as September 2002, Philips sold its contract-manufacturing unit for CE 
goods (PCMS, set up by Philips in 1999) to the U.S.-based EMS (electronics manufacturing services) 
company, Jabil Circuit, Inc.  Under the pact, Philips guaranteed sales worth $4 billion to Jabil over a 
period of four years even after the unit was sold.  Jabil also acquired nine of Philips‟s plants (mostly in 
low-cost locations worldwide) and 5,000 employees, which include 150 design engineers. 
The year 1997 was significant for Philips, in that, followed by a loss of $349 million in 1996, 
the company went through a series of measures to boost profits and these included a host of 
outsourcing deals. Executive VP-CFO Eustace said, “In the past, we did not „contain our creativity‟, 
under the label of freedom, we were spending an enormous amount of money on R&D.” (TV Digest 
1997a, p. 12).  This statement indicates the direction of Philips‟s upcoming strategies toward 
outsourcing whereby it reduced its R&D expenditures. In October 1997, Philips moved from in-house 
production of 19”-20” TV tubes to sourcing them from Samsung and Toshiba.  In the same year, it sold 
its TV plant in Greeneville, Tennessee, in the U.S. to Taylor-White.  As recently as 2001, Philips laid 
off employees at its own VCR factory in Austria and instead moved production of VCRs to Japan‟s 
Funai Electric. Philips gradually reduced its R&D function for CE products and ultimately lost its 
technological capabilities (next stages).  
Like the American and European CE firms before it, Sony also eventually gave in to pressures 
and increased its reliance on outside operators and slowly moved toward outsourcing deals with 
foreign firms. But, some of Sony‟s first outsourcing ventures were with domestic companies that it was 
familiar with.  For example, Sony‟s audio speaker manufacturing subsidiary Audio Research was 
launched in 1969 as a joint venture of Sony and Pioneer but Sony acquired it in 1972.  In 1983, it sold 
Audio Research in Japan to Minebea, a Japanese producer of ball bearings.  Nevertheless, Sony 
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maintained ties with Audio Research in the form of an outsourcing relationship whereby Sony 
continued to be its customer and provided it with R&D support.  Their relationship constituted a 
typical Japanese-style keiretsu relationship.  
Sony also entered into agreements with many different firms in low-cost countries to supply 
components.  In October 2000, Sony was outsourcing 60-70 percent of its radio and speakers 
manufacturing and around 50 percent of its component stereos to Chinese equipment makers. The 
company claimed that outsourcing to Asian countries such as China and Taiwan would boost its 
competitiveness against Western firms.  
Sony went on to increase outsourcing to other firms such as U.S.-based personal computers and 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Solectron
4
 in 2000. Under the pact, Solectron acquired 
two of Sony‟s manufacturing units, one in Japan and the other in Taiwan. Solectron was to retain the 
employees at the factories and supply products to Sony as well as to other customers.  Solectron had 
been expanding through mergers and had previously acquired Singapore's NatSteel Electronics for 
$2.4 billion in anticipation of catering to Japanese business (Wilson 2001). By outsourcing production, 
Sony hoped to lower costs and increase profitability. 
Thenceforth, Sony continued to divest its manufacturing operations in an attempt to reduce 
fixed investment. At the extreme, Sony even considered outsourcing production of its core CE 
production to its unit, Aiwa, 50 percent owned by Sony at the time.  Regarding Sony‟s decision to 
outsource production to third parties, the company‟s President Ando was reported as saying, “There 
will be some products on which we think it better to entrust the production also to non-Sony group 
companies and business partners, and we currently outsource some audio products” (AFX News 2000).  
Sony was outsourcing some manufacturing to Celestica, Flextronics and SCI systems. The move to 
increase outsourcing followed a fall in profits in 1999. By March 2003, Sony had reduced the number 
of its factories worldwide from 70 (in 1999) to 54.  Sony hoped that by outsourcing, it could reduce the 
fixed costs of manufacturing by transferring it to other contractor firms and instead be involved more 
in the design and planning stages of products.  Sony planned to increase its reliance on products from 
Taiwanese vendors to $938 million by 2001.  
 Thus, Stage 2 was marked by significant divestitures by our firms, some of which were to local 
partners in foreign locations. This enabled the firms to reduce fixed costs but this move gradually 
pushed these firms into Stage 3 of our model. As outsourcing appeared to produce short-term benefits, 




Stage 3: Increasing Dependence on Foreign Suppliers  
In the case of Emerson Radio, NUC sold the brand name to Major Electronics in 1973.  U.S.-based 
Major Electronics used to produce radios, tape recorders and other equipment. In 1968 the company 
began importing these products from overseas establishments and became a distributor of finished Far 
Eastern goods.  When it took over Emerson Radio, it was buying 80 percent of its components and 
products from East Asia.  In 1980 Emerson Radio dropped its last U.S.-made product--the phonograph 
line--because labor costs had made it unprofitable.  Thus Emerson was completely dependent on 
foreign suppliers for all its finished products. As firm President Stephen Lane commented, "I think 
most of the profits we've made have been because of controlling overhead and purchasing." (Forbes 
1981)  According to Lane, “Our philosophy is simple, that is, to have the best of two worlds.  To be in 
sophisticated, state-of-the-art products by maintaining our own engineering and design capabilities 
here and keeping close tabs on quality control at all our vendors, and at the same time being able to 
react quickly to changes by having no hard assets, which would mean worrying about keeping factories 
going and people employed in a recession” (Mehler 1984, p. 86). Other than manufacturing 
capabilities, Emerson Radio also lost its design and technical capabilities as it made its fortune by 
persuading its East Asian suppliers to imitate high-end, branded (Sony, Panasonic) CE products and 
then selling them to consumers at much lower prices. Based on published records, around the mid-
1980s, Emerson Radio had outsourcing deals with over 15 Asian suppliers, which depended on 
Emerson for over 90 percent of their business.  In November 1984, Lane claimed, “It‟s been 12 years 
since we achieved our running goal of 5 (percent) net of sales” (Mehler 1984, p. 87).  About this time, 
Emerson possessed design and engineering capabilities only for audio products, “But, in the video 
area, outside of the cabinetry, the U.S. firm has deferred to the superior design skills of its Japanese 
suppliers, such as Mitsubishi” (Mehler, 1984 p. 86). 
 Emerson struggled to hang on to its CE business. In 1985, it acquired a CE company H.H. 
Scott, a relatively small producer of audio equipment; in 1986, it introduced Asian-made refrigerators 
to the market; and in the following couple of years added several more electronics-related products to 
its range including computers in 1990. However, by 1991, it had withdrawn the H. H. Scott line and 
some other CE products.  In the late 1980s, having lost its CE capabilities, it had begun diversifying 
into other areas   By the early 1990s, Emerson Radio was heavily in debt of over $200 million.  To add 
to that, it was involved in lawsuits and in 1993, the company finally filed for bankruptcy.  What 
remains of the old Emerson Radio today is its brand name. Even today the company capitalizes on the 
brand by licensing it to other CE firms.  Philips experienced its own share of troubles due to increased 
outsourcing. In 1988, Philips‟ woes reflected those of the U.S. CE firms not too long ago.  Philips‟s 
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income fell again and the company claimed that competition from the Far East led to its problems. As 
Philips itself established plants abroad and outsourced production, it gradually increased its 
dependence on these foreign suppliers and unintentionally but invariably passed on tacit knowledge. 
The Philips-Sony liaison was a particularly interesting one.  It began in October 1979 when the two 
companies joined hands to use each other‟s patent rights for certain products (tapes, cassettes, discs, 
etc).  This pact gave Sony access to Philips‟s V2000 system as well as its CD-audio system.  Industry 
analysts concluded that due to this arrangement, Sony learned to manufacture its own optical videodisc 
for consumer use although the company denied these charges.  Philips meanwhile had plans to launch 
videodiscs in Europe by 1980.  Philips made consumer versions while Sony made industrial videodiscs 
until 1982 when Sony announced that it would sell its videodiscs in Knoxville, North American 
Philips‟s hometown. 
Philips continued to post lower income forecasts toward the end of the 1980s and planned to 
cut its workforce by 10,000-20,000 globally in the following years. The company hoped that its initial 
measures for cost cutting would increase profitability. But, in 1988, Philips lowered its forecast for the 
year and announced that it would take severe measures to improve its operations through further cost 
cutting. In reaction to lower earnings, the company reduced its European plants from 170 to 110 in the 
next five years and also shifted more production to Mexico and Taiwan.  The company already 
operated plants in these countries at the time and this shift increased the company‟s reliance on these 
foreign plants. It hoped to cut costs by $400 million. The company started to improve profitability for a 
while until profits fell again. And so the efforts went on. Toward the end of the 1990s, Philips was 
looking for buyers for its TV assembly plant in Juarez, Mexico (TV Digest 1998). 
In the late 1980s Philips was involved in R&D of LCD (Liquid Crystal Display), a joint project 
of four of Philips‟s divisions, consumer electronics, lighting, research and components. Although a 
certain part of the development efforts used to take place at headquarters in Eindhoven, the 
Netherlands, production was shifted to the Philips-owned plant, Marantz, in Japan. In 1986, Philips 
reorganized Marantz Japan into an R&D base.  Prior to 1988, NAP outsourced production of TVs to 
Matsushita but in 1988, Marantz (Marantz Japan Inc or MJI) began shipping VCRs to the United 
States for sale under Philips‟s brand. In 1988, Philips manufactured liquid display TVs at the Marantz 
plant and later increased its reliance on that manufacturing facility by producing wireless radio 
equipment in 1991 and new CD players in 1999. In 1997, Marantz introduced its own (Marantz-
branded) low price version (with some small changes) of Philips‟ television models in Asia. Hence, 
Marantz, 50.6 percent owned by Philips at the time had learned Philips‟ technology, upgraded its 
competences and forward integrated into launching and marketing its own line of similar products. 
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Finally, in 2001, Philips reduced its controlling ownership stake in MJI, which also acquired the 
„Marantz‟ brand and its business in Europe and the U.S. from Philips and established its own units in 
these places. The companies still maintained working relations in many areas, but MJI also developed 
and introduced its own products (mainly audio equipment) under its own brand name, Marantz. A year 
later, in 2002, Philips further reduced its stake to 14.7 percent in MJI when MJI merged with U.S.-
based Denon Ltd.  
The late 1990s was the age of the DVD technology in the CE industry and ideally Philips 
should have been a formidable contender.  But, by his own admission, the Philips Sound & Vision 
Chairman and CEO said with respect to Philips‟ DVD program in the U.S., “We‟ve had to catch up on 
DVD in every sense of the word. We didn‟t have a DVD program 12 months ago and now we‟ve 
launched a player” (TV Digest 1997b, p. 15). The company launched a DVD player that was being 
sourced from Toshiba (Japan).  By the end of the 20
th
 century, Philips was on its way out of the CE 
industry having lost most of its development capabilities.  
Meanwhile, Japan‟s Sony faced its own set of challenges with its partners. Even after selling its 
audio speaker manufacturing subsidiary Audio Research to Minebea in 1983 (explained in Stage 2 
above), Sony maintained ties with Audio Research in the form of an outsourcing relationship whereby 
Sony continued to be its customer and to provide it with R&D support. The following year, Minebea 
set up its own subsidiary for audio R&D by merging Audio Research (acquired from Sony) with 
another of its divisions, Minebea Denshi Co., Ltd.  In this manner, Minebea learned Sony‟s audio 
research capabilities. 
What started off as simple contractual agreements with foreign operators eventually led Sony to 
increase its reliance on its partners. Agreements also took the form of joint ventures.  For example, in 
1992, Viettronics Tan Binh, a Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam-based local electric appliance maker, was in 
a licensing pact with Sony to produce color TVs and audio players. In 1994, Sony established a joint 
venture with the same company to manufacture 14-inch and 21-inch Trinitron color TVs and audio 
products for the Vietnamese market. Thus, with this new venture in 1994, Sony in fact increased its 
dependence on Viettronics (from licensing to joint venture) to jointly manufacture goods at low cost.  
After the Solectron deal in 2000, Sony announced that it would farm out more production to 
independent manufacturers if need be. It also finalized plans to create engineering, manufacturing and 
customer services units to cater to the needs of Sony and other firms that outsourced production. 
Taiwan being a source of low-cost labor, Sony increased its reliance on Taiwanese firms to supply its 
products. In merely a period of one year, Sony bought goods worth $2 billion from Taiwan in 2001, 
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which was an increase of seven times on the year 2000. Such was the extent of its increasing reliance 
on subcontractors.  
In February 2003, Sony entered a contract with Oak Technology to supply decoder chips to 
Sony, which would replace IC (integrated circuit) chips developed by Sony‟s in-house facility. To start 
with, the decoder chips were to be used in Sony‟s digital TVs to be sold in Japan but Oak Tech 
planned to supply chips for use in Sony‟s products sold in Europe and the U.S. later on. Previously, 
Oak Tech was in a similar decoder supply pact with Sony for its personal video recorders in Japan. 
Oak Tech also supplied chips to other CE companies like Thomson and Daewoo − another example of 
Sony‟s ever growing dependence on external suppliers and the increasing capabilities of such 
suppliers. 
The year 2003 witnessed an awakening at Sony. Touted as the „Sony Shock‟, Sony incurred a 
net loss of $927 million in the first three months of 2003.  Many said that Sony‟s state reflected that of 
the Japanese CE industry and also the economy as a whole. But the unpredictable global environment 
and the company‟s activities in the past few years might have exacerbated its performance. Sony had 
introduced only a few „new‟ products in the recent past and to add to that, it was losing its once fêted 
technological ability to innovate.  The company used to “generate huge profit from its vertically 
integrated business model in which it developed high-performance parts …on a commercial basis 
before anyone else and released hit products based on them” (Nikkei Weekly 2003).  However, in the 
1990s, it lost a major part of its technological glory.  According to Ken Kutaragi, President of Sony 
Computer Entertainment and a recent addition to Sony‟s top management team, “top management 
chose not to continue investing in technology” (SinoCast China IT Watch, 2003).   
Sony‟s technological excellence and product creativity were further tarnished by recalls in 1996 
of Sony-made lithium-ion batteries used for notebook computers.  The Sony batteries have been 
blamed for causing some Dell and Apple computers to overheat and catch fire.  As if to rub salt into 
Sony‟s wounds, due to delays in production of blue laser diodes, a key component of Blue-ray Disc 
players, Sony was also forced to postpone the European release of the PlayStation 3 game console 
from November 2006 to March 2007.  Sony's current crises are also attributed to its increased 
outsourcing by farming out a large part of production of these components to EMS (electronic 
manufacturing services) companies (Nikkei News, 2006). 
 
Stage 4: Industry Departure or Reduction of Outsourcing. 
As time went by, Emerson Radio and Philips lost their place in the CE industry. Emerson Radio moved 
through the first three stages of the model so quickly that it did not get a chance to salvage itself and 
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instead sought to diversify into other, sometimes unrelated areas.  The brand name „Emerson‟ was 
associated solely with CE and having lost its technological competences, the firm is presently 
struggling to survive.  Philips managed to shift its focus away from CE to its lighting and other 
businesses and managed to survive but not as a significant CE player.   
Although Philips was originally founded as a lighting company, it made a very successful 
transition into CE and maintained its foothold in the industry for several decades. What is evident is 
that at several times Philips experienced declining profitability, restructured its organization and 
altered its strategies.  Prior to the 1970s, Philips changed its strategy from one of local responsiveness 
to a more global strategy and reduced product lines. Then at the time of the failure of its V2000 home 
video system around 1980, Philips believed that it was probably due to its lack of partnership with 
other companies to effectively commercialize its technology (Dai 1996). More recently, in 1996, 
Philips incurred a loss of $349 million on year and the company once again decided to increase 
outsourcing and increase its reliance on third party manufacturers.  As of 2002, Philips planned to 
increase outsourcing of chip production from 10 percent to between 20-30 percent. The company also 
increased its reliance on products from United Microelectronics Corp. and Singapore-based Chartered 
Semiconductor Manufacturing. Thus, Philips never reduced outsourcing but instead increased it. In 
June 2001, Philips even abandoned its wireless phone manufacturing efforts and to cut costs, it also 
reduced its interest in its Chinese R&D plant by transferring control over to its Chinese partner, which 
was to make phones and supply them to Philips for sale under Philips‟s name.  At the dawn of the 21st 
century, Philips was no longer an independent producer in the CE industry.  It sold off its remaining 
CE divisions including Polygram and “to emphasize the shift of Philips‟ business out of CE, the CEO, 
Cor Boonstra, moved Philips‟ headquarters from Eindhoven to Amsterdam” (Chandler 2001, p. 221). 
Today, Philips markets CE products but its main focus is on its other divisions such as lighting and 
semiconductors.  
The only company that is still active in the industry, Sony, is learning the hazards of excessive 
outsourcing and gradually reducing its reliance on outsiders for its core products. Although Sony is 
better known for CE than semiconductors, it uses semiconductors in many of its CE products (digital 
cameras, camcorders).  In 1998, Sony‟s profits fell along with those of other Japanese companies in the 
semiconductors industry such as Toshiba and Fujitsu. However, the slump was attributed to lower 
demand for their products.  Surprisingly, in 2000, Sony reduced outsourcing for semiconductors by 5 
percent and also shifted to in-house production of some of its „most wanted‟ products like personal 
computers, camcorders and digital cameras. There is no hard evidence that shows why Sony reduced 
outsourcing for its core products, but this move followed a fall in profits in 1999.  In the year 2000, 
 19 
Sony announced that it would set up a „supervisory company‟, which would be responsible for 
management of design, purchase and manufacturing for several of Sony‟s plants.  Thus, although Sony 
has not entirely eliminated its dependence on outsourcing to keep costs under control, it has moved 
toward in-house production of its popular money-making products. Also, the establishment of a 
company to monitor production indicates a very cautious components strategy. As Sony President, 
Ando said, “Engineering and manufacturing are (some of) Sony‟s key strengths. That is why key 
products will be done by our own internal production, not OEM” (Financial Times 2000, p. 36).  
The fear of technology falling in the wrong hands also extends to national governments.  In 
2000, the Japanese government imposed an export control on Sony's PlayStation 2 (PS2) electronic 
game console.  PS2's 128-bit central microprocessor developed by Sony and Toshiba had twice the raw 
number-crunching power of Intel's most advanced Pentium chip used in professional desktop 
computers.  When coupled with a video camera, PS2 could make an ideal missile-guidance system 
(Economist 2000, Re 2003).  Then in 2001, Sony was to outsource the console of its PS2 product to 
Taiwanese firms capable of producing at low costs. There were two drivers for this outsourcing 
initiative.  First was Sony‟s inability to meet demand and second was Microsoft‟s move to outsource 
the XBOX (in direct competition with PS2) to firms in Taiwan.  The U.S. and Japanese governments 
asked Sony to keep production and assembly of the console in Japan lest the Taiwanese firms (who 
were low-cost subcontractors) could learn the DVD application of the console‟s chip and use it for 
military purposes (Yu/Teng 2001).  In 2001, Sony also announced that it would not expand 
outsourcing of its personal computers production at its plant in China. 
Although on the surface it appears to have evaded the grave dangers of excessive outsourcing 
by contracting out only „peripheral operations,‟ it continues to face the danger of losing its core 
competences.  In May 2002, Sony stressed the fact that it was keeping key technologies in Japan as 
compared with other Japanese makers who were throwing away their future due to outsourcing.  In 
September 2002 it was reported that “Three of Japan‟s leading electronics manufacturers will start 
making DVD recorders, reversing a trend for outsourcing the production of such items” (Pilling 2002).  
Sony is one of those companies. Whereas on one hand, Sony reacted to its weakening situation by 
reducing outsourcing for its core operations, it continued to outsource peripheral technologies. Sony 
did not focus on increasing investment in developing technology or its reinstating control over 
manufacturing operations until its awakening in 2003.  In 2003, the company took proactive measures 
to improve its position in the industry. Under the leadership of Kutaragi, it has charted out a course to 
bring it back to its role as a technological leader.  For the purpose, it planned to invest $8.6 billion in 
“electrical equipment and electronics over three years and the introduction of in-house production and 
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centralized management of key components” (Nikkei Weekly 2003).  Sony also revealed that it would 
reduce the number of components used to 100,000 parts (90 percent decrease) by the year 2005 and 
also indicate 20,000 standard parts to be shared by engineers, company-wide. By doing so, it would be 
able to shorten the time taken for new product development. In late 2005, Sony announced that under 
the leadership of its first ever, foreign Chief Executive Howard Stringer, it would reduce 10,000 jobs 
and close 11 of its 65 plants to boost profits at its electronics unit. However, these cuts and closures 
were not expected to affect jobs and plants in China, its low cost manufacturing location. 
 
A Stage Model 
With these cases in hand, we can now construct a stage model around outsourcing and competences 
that draws upon existing theory, specifically the resource-based view and dynamic capabilities 
perspective (Barney 1991, Leiblein/Reuer/Dalsace 2002, Teece/Pisano/Shuen 1997) and work on value 
appropriation in alliances (Nooteboom 1999). The relationship between outsourcing and a firm‟s 
competences, the set of routines in which it has specialized, is a complex one. On the one hand, 
outsourcing can free up resources that can be used to speed up or redirect competence development in 
other areas, the argument used by some proponents of outsourcing (Quinn 1999). In our cases, 
however, we observe the inverse effect as over time outsourcing seemed to lead to a loss of 
competences. Our stage model contains a description of the process through which such competence 
loss occurs. We then tackle the question under which conditions such a process presents itself and, 
related to that, when it does not. 
The resource-based view of the firm suggests that firms can be conceived of as controlling 
bundles of resources, also called competences (Barney 1991, Wernerfelt 1984). These competences are 
constructed through previous experience and over time. When resources are valuable, hard to imitate 
and substitute and rare, they can lead to sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991). The 
dynamic capabilities approach (Teece/Pisano/Shuen 1997) adds to this a process perspective by 
suggesting that capabilities are constructed through evolutionary, path-dependent, processes. 
Outsourcing invariably involves ceding some control over resources, for instance, in the form of 
transferring machinery, technology, and/or people. In an arm‟s length transaction all control is ceded. 
In a cooperative or partnership outsourcing relationship, firms arguably maintain some control over 
resources, even if these physically reside at suppliers. 
In such relations there are two key questions.  The first question is how much value is created 
and the second is who gets to appropriate that value (Nooteboom 1999). Value creation is not a central 
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concern here, but suffice it to say that various mechanisms can be instated by the outsourcing partners 
to create additional rents (Dyer/Singh 1998). In our cases, lack of value appropriation is the central 
concern – one that has been addressed in the literature as well (Nooteboom 1999, Porter 1980, Teece 
1986, 2000). One way in which insufficient value appropriation may occur is when in-house 
competences are leaked to the supplier, for instance, in the form of the supplier taking on board the 
outsourcing firm‟s intellectual property rights (Teece 2000), a problem especially prevalent when no 
institutional guarantees are provided (Teece 1986). The supplier may subsequently start to compete 
head-on with the outsourcing firm or supply to competing firms leading to a loss in bargaining power 
(Porter 1980). Another possibility is the gradual erosion of the firm‟s internal competences because it 
can no longer engage in learning-by-doing leading to hollowing out (Bettis/Bradley/Hamel 1992, 
Kotabe 1998). 
Our stage model, based on the three CE cases, integrates both streams of literature. We suggest 
that firms need to maintain and develop their competence base in order to sustain their advantages vis-
à-vis competitors, but may be unable to do so when engaging in (international) outsourcing because 
they cannot distill enough value from their relations with suppliers. We propose that there is a „vicious 
outsourcing cycle‟, which occurs when the future need for in-house competences differs substantially 
from the currently perceived need and firms are unable to bridge that difference because they are too 
dependent on outsourcing. Specifically, a vicious outsourcing cycle can occur when firms either lose 
competences whose contribution is not understood well enough or close off trajectories of competence 
learning that prove to be important in the future. One might alternatively refer to these conditions as 
causal ambiguity and uncertainty. Figure 1 below describes the different stages of the outsourcing 
cycle. 
__________________________ 
Place Figure 1 about here 
___________________________ 
 
In Stage 1, firms see an opportunity to lower their production costs by shifting in-house 
production to a different country. As we showed above, Philips, for instance, set up plants in a wide 
range of low labor cost countries in the 1960s. Vernon‟s (1974) international product life cycle model 
clearly illustrates this stage. Because of substantial labor cost differentials, the existing production 
location, which is normally the firm‟s home country in the early stages of internationalization, is no 
longer seen as competitive. Sometimes other, more qualitative factors, such as the need to access new 
customers or suppliers, may come into play as well as has been documented in the literature on plant 
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locations and facility management (Ferdows 1997). In terms of Dunning‟s (1988) organization, 
location, and internalization (OLI) model, which intends to explain when certain types of 
internationalization may or may not occur, activities are transferred from the home base to low-cost 
countries in order to benefit from L-type advantages available in these offshore locations and because a 
firm possesses the O-type advantages necessary to engage in international production. As a 
consequence of this decision, production and engineering capabilities are transferred and replicated 
abroad. Such a decision will bring relief in the short term as it allows the firm to maintain or improve 
its margins.  As suggested above, Emerson increased its profits in 1959 after a cost-cutting operation. 
However, because most locations are not unique, competitors can easily replicate location 
decisions, and perhaps even improve on them. There are many instances of an industry-wide 
bandwagon where firms all relocate to the same country, for example in textiles production. The 
classic description of such bandwagons in international business is Knickerbocker‟s (1973) work on 
“follow-the-leader” in foreign direct investment. In other words, after some time competitors will 
offset any temporary gains from a production shift. If cost pressures remain high and there is 
overcapacity in the industry, the firm finds itself in need of taking additional measures. In our cases 
this tended to show up in the form of some immediate financial crisis, which came upon each of the 
three firms at some point in time. 
When responding to such a crisis, one important option is to sell off the foreign production 
plant to an independent operator and outsource production to this firm or simply to outsource without 
selling existing assets – Stage 2 of the model. As we saw, Emerson for instance started to make 
extensive use of Asian OEM‟s. Referring again to the OLI model, the advantages of internalization (I) 
seem to have disappeared to the point where the market (outsourcing) is seen as a better solution. If 
these advantages decrease, outsourcing becomes a more viable option.  In the case of Sony this 
occurred when it outsourced most of the making of stereo equipment to Chinese suppliers. Production 
and engineering capabilities are now transferred to or replicated by the supplier because the 
outsourcing firm will help it set up production. Thus the value appropriation issues mentioned earlier 
(Nooteboom 1999, Teece 2000) emerge.  
Given that there are such issues around value appropriation, what motives do firms have for 
moving from stage 1 to stage 2 of our model? An outsourcing firm replaces internal fixed costs by the 
production costs of outside suppliers which are variable from its perspective. This lowers the 
breakeven point, providing the firm with more flexibility to respond to unforeseen changes, which are 
quite common in the CE industry. In particular, it helps the firm to reduce the size of potential losses. 
Since in our cases outsourcing often appears to be a consequence of a drop in sales and profitability, 
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this move seems sensible if further drops can be expected.  Financial markets for instance may 
appreciate such decisions in the context of the CE industry where firms like Emerson and Philips saw 
themselves confronted with ever more intense competition from Asian producers. In case of a crisis the 
alternative to outsourcing is to restructure internally, which often does not involve terminating the 
production of specific components, like outsourcing may do, but of entire products. The wholesale 
closure of plants can be socially and politically sensitive and costly, and therefore outsourcing may be 
a preferred solution. 
But if the firm outsources its fixed costs in this way, these costs will still have to be borne by 
the independent supplier instead.  Unless that supplier can find a way to be more cost-efficient and to 
make these costs variable, such a move could amount to a mere accounting fallacy.  Perhaps some 
managers and some investors buy into this but we have little hard evidence that is the case. Yet, as 
illustrated by the emergence of EMS (electronics manufacturing services) companies, there are reasons 
to believe that independent suppliers can be more cost-efficient and can make better use of fixed 
investments. First, independent local suppliers, operating in a low-cost location, do not have to bear the 
same overheads that producers from more expensive countries, like Emerson, Philips and later Sony, 
faced. They are run locally and, being a much smaller firm, can also be more nimble.  Second, and 
related to the first point, their expenses for research and development are much lower, at least initially, 
as they import more advanced technology from elsewhere. Philips and Sony, for example, have large 
R&D bases because they want to be first movers in new technologies, whereas the supplier in a low-
cost country would be content with adopting new technologies invented by others.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the outsourcing firm needs to spread its fixed costs over a relatively fixed volume of 
products but the independent supplier has the option to supply other customers, thereby reusing its 
assets.  So after outsourcing takes place, the supplier can enjoy larger economies of scale in 
production, resulting in further lower average costs because fixed costs are spread over a higher 
volume of production.  For example, this logic applied to Aiwa, as Sony was contemplating to 
outsource more production to it. 
Furthermore, outsourcing changes the incentive structure of the independent supplier in 
important ways. Some arguments for this may be found in Grossman and Hart‟s (1986) „theory of 
costly contracting‟, also known as the property rights approach.  They suggest that outsourcing takes 
place when it is relatively easy to write complete contracts, in which specific rights can be assigned to 
both the outsourcing firm and its supplier. When this is the case, there is no longer an incentive for the 
outsourcing firm to own and vertically integrate the supplier (Grossman/Hart 1986).  For this to 
happen, a supplier must develop a set of distinct production capabilities for a component or product, to 
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which property rights may then be assigned. These distinct capabilities can develop if the product 
architecture is well-understood, allowing for easy separation of tasks.  Once the supplier has gained its 
independence, it can then develop its capabilities further, which leads to future cost improvements. The 
supplier will have an incentive to develop its production capabilities because these will directly drive 
its cost levels, and hence its profitability, and indirectly its ability to retain the outsourcing firm as a 
customer in the future and to attract further customers. Because both the outsourcing firm and potential 
future customers will be making a comparison of their own production capabilities with those of the 
supplier firm, the supplier‟s odds of attracting future business increase with improvements in those 
capabilities (Jacobides/Winter 2005). In Quinn‟s (1999) view, the supplier builds these advantages, to 
the extent that it can become best-in-world in the production of this component or product, through 
increasing focus.  
Over time several changes can occur that alter the balance of decision-making and push firms 
into Stage 3. One change, quite common in the context of emerging countries, is learning by the 
supplier, which can take the forms of increased productivity and upgraded production capabilities, as 
discussed above. Philips experienced this in its earlier ventures with Japanese producers and Sony 
found this out in Taiwan. If supplier productivity is increased by learning-by-doing and this increase is 
shared exclusively with the outsourcing company and not with its competitors, there is no real 
problem.  However, when suppliers manage to upgrade their own competences, there is little to prevent 
them from forward integration into the firm‟s markets. Thus the supplier can easily become a 
competitor. Emerson found itself competing against the Asian producers who were initially its 
suppliers. The buyer now has serious problems to appropriate as much value from the relationship as it 
would like to. When the gain of a buyer-supplier alliance is no longer shared evenly in the eyes of the 
buyer, it may want to reconsider its motives for having entered that alliance (Doz/Hamel 1998). 
The bargaining constellation is a second area of possible change (Porter 1980).  When the 
supplier starts to supply to competing firms as well, it will grow in size, become less dependent on the 
original buyer, and raise prices, which may pose the outsourcing firm with the need to build up 
alternative supply sources, if that is possible in the first place. Rather than the supplier being captive, 
the buyer can become captive this way. A third change can be in the outsourcing firm‟s in-house 
capacity to produce and engineer the product. Because the firm no longer produces the product, it will 
become more difficult to keep particularly tacit knowledge about production technology up-to-date as 
loss of manufacturing experience leads to a loss in development capability, particularly for existing 
products (Dankbaar 2007).  Emerson for instance had clearly given up on the idea of retaining any 
production knowledge in-house. This may also affect the ability to implement engineering changes. 
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The supplier will need to become involved in the design of the next generation of the product. Under 
each of these scenarios, there is change that occurs after initial contracting and that increases the 
outsourcing (buyer) firm‟s long-term dependence on the supplier because that supplier now possesses 
more competences relative to the buyer. 
Because our evidence on Stage 4 is limited as the electronics industry is still evolving, our 
discussion of it is perhaps best interpreted as a form of informed theoretical speculation. When faced 
with a situation like Stage 3, firms essentially have two options in Stage 4.  Firms can exit the industry 
altogether as Emerson and to some extent Philips have done. Or they can decide to take activities back 
in-house, as Sony has begun doing in recent years.  This choice can be likened to Hirschman‟s (1970) 
exit-voice model, where decision-makers also have the choice between departing from the scene and 
engaging and confronting a problem.  Leroy‟s (1976) detailed empirical work on U.S. multinational 
firms‟ production location decisions along the international product life cycle (IPLC) model points to 
this strategic dichotomy.  He traced their production location decisions over time.  In reality, a majority 
of U.S. multinationals stopped short of reaching the last stage of the IPLC as theorized by Vernon 
(1974), where the subsidiaries of those U.S. multinationals based in developing countries would have 
become the net exporters to the U.S. of what had once been products innovated in the U.S.  His 
conclusion alluded to U.S. firms‟ reliance on product innovations and reluctance to investing in 
manufacturing process innovations.  This finding is consistent in a way with later studies that found the 
sustained competitiveness of many Japanese firms resulting from their pursuit of process innovations 
(e.g., Cusumano 1988, Kotabe 1990).  Exiting the industry equates to admitting the competence loss is 
too large to overcome.  
Facing the problem, like Sony, sounds like a much easier task than it actually is. First, it will 
require precisely those fixed investments that the firm‟s business model is no longer based on. Thus 
the question is how to fund this reversal and make it consistent with the firm‟s strategy.  Second, the 
firm will by now have lost much of its ability to produce and engineer the product and will have to 
seriously update its competences by training people and obtaining knowledge externally. Both may 
come at a high price, particularly since the competitive and technological landscapes may have 
changed substantially in the meantime. Hence in Stage 4 there is no ideal solution to the problems 
around competence losses that a firm has accumulated through the first three stages. 
The stage model raises several further questions.  One is why the loss of competences would 
occur, as it appears to be inconsistent with perfectly rational managerial decision-making. Several 
reasons come to mind.  A lack of foresight perhaps produced by technological or volume uncertainty, 
is one possibility. Differing estimations of the buyer‟s and the supplier‟s ability to develop the 
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underlying competences in future could be another.  Another possible reason is strategic myopia that 
makes the short-term consequences of not outsourcing, in the form of higher fixed costs and higher 
production costs, look worse than the long-term consequences of outsourcing, in the form of a loss of 
technological prowess (Bettis/Bradley/Hamel 1992, Doig/Ritter/Speckhals/Woolson 2001, Kotabe 
1998).  For instance, the more immediate trigger for outsourcing decisions in our cases appeared to be 
a downturn in business cycles and short term losses that firms were facing. Outsourcing may also be 
perceived as a response to adverse demand conditions because of its propensity to lower the breakeven 
point.  This could be framed as a „Faustian dilemma‟5. Because of immediate pressures to compete in 
the marketplace, firms need to focus and streamline their production activities. But in order to do so, 
they have to „sell their soul‟, namely their core assets and capabilities, which in the long run will catch 
up with them. Viewed in this way, there is no myopia but simply a lack of strategic choice. This 
determinism inevitably drives firms towards more outsourcing. A further implication is that causality 
in our model may well run in both directions, since poor results lead to more outsourcing as much as 
more outsourcing may lead to poorer results. 
A second question is why our three case study firms experienced their outsourcing cycles and 
resulting competence losses at different points in time, with Emerson being first in roughly the 1950s 
to 1970s, Philips following in roughly the 1970s to 1990s, and Sony being last in roughly the 1980s to 
2000s.  Other CE producers from the same Triad regions seemed to go through the same timing.  We 
would like to suggest that it is a combination of the cost competitiveness of the home country and the 
mental models and financial incentives of managers in the country that are responsible for such 
differences in timing.  Over time, and with the development of their home economies, firms found that 
their home country simply could not compete with offshore locations anymore because labor costs 
were too high.  This effect may have occurred in the United States before it did in Europe, partly 
because European firms were more effective at limiting imports from lower cost producers.  In Japan it 
may again have come at a later time, not until the 1980s. But managers in these countries are also 
different.  In Japan, outsourcing is seen as a problem-solving tool, while in the U.S. it tends to be a 
problem-removal tool (Kotabe 1998).  And U.S. managers are incentivized to achieve good short-term 
results, encouraging them to find cost savings through outsourcing, while this is less true for European 
(especially Germanic) managers or Japanese managers.  The latter group is rewarded for market share 
growth more than for financial results alone (Kotabe 1998).  Our earlier quote from the Emerson 
executive illustrates the point. 
A third point is whether firms necessarily need to go through all stages for the competence loss 
to occur. Although this is ultimately an empirical question, our cases seem to show that all three firms 
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went through the first three stages in more or less chronological fashion. In Stage 4 they took different 
routes, though, with Sony appearing to use a voice, engagement strategy, and Emerson and Philips 
preferring an exit strategy. So there are different responses to the loss of competences through 
outsourcing. At the same time we think it is feasible that some firms, like SMEs, never set up foreign 
operations but immediately engage in international outsourcing.  Mol, van Tulder and Beije (2005) 
seemed to have evidence for this in their empirical study. Such firms will probably transfer fewer 
assets and less knowledge to their foreign suppliers and are therefore perhaps not as prone as larger 
firms to competence losses. The smaller volumes these firms produce might also make it less attractive 
for their suppliers to engage in forward integration. This touches upon the intriguing and more general 
issue how inward and outward internationalization processes are related. 
Finally, we would like to raise the related issue of the conditions under which this stage model 
is most likely to apply.  Several requirements appear to apply.  First, there is causal ambiguity and 
uncertainty over future technological and competence trajectories as discussed above. In transaction 
cost economics terms, this implies that asset specificity levels cannot be estimated with much certainty, 
and are subject to change, and that uncertainty makes it difficult to contract with suppliers. Second, the 
rise of new, lower cost producers in emerging countries that puts additional competitive and cost 
pressures on incumbents from developed countries. Third, the presence of international trade regimes 
that allow for this type of outsourcing. And finally a certain size of production is needed as well. 
Therefore we think the stage model may be generalized to some situations, especially larger firms 
competing in highly competitive and technologically intensive industries. One interesting thought 
experiment is whether Chinese automobile and component suppliers are going to benefit from 
collaborative agreements with Western producers and the purchase of technology like the acquisition 
of the remains of Rover in the U.K. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
Outsourcing can be more than a cost-cutting device and potentially contributes to a firm‟s competence 
base (Quinn 1999).  There are, however, circumstances under which outsourcing leads to competence 
destruction.  Through documenting the experiences of three firms in the CE industry we illustrated 
how such competence destruction through outsourcing takes place and coined it the vicious 
outsourcing cycle.  Clearly not all outsourcing processes will adhere to such a cycle.  When firms 
outsource competences that later become important platforms for growth and innovation, the vicious 
outsourcing cycle can occur.  This stands in contrast to the use of outsourcing to obtain new 
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competences (Barney 1999, Quinn 1999), because in our cases supplier competences appear to be less 
complementary and more overlapping, which generates the possibility of forward integration by 
suppliers. In such instances it is important for firms to consider the future value of in-house production 
rather than merely the present costs of keeping production in-house versus outsourcing it.   
For instance, it was evident in the Philips case that on the basis of its past capabilities in R&D, 
it should have been able to compete in the DVD market. But due to excessive outsourcing of 
components and products before the age of the DVD, it “did not have a DVD program” in the U.S. 
market as conceded by Philips Sound and Vision Chairman and CEO Doug Dunn (TV Digest 1997b, p. 
15). Its European DVD launch also proved to be unsuccessful. One of the main reasons was that 
Philips‟ DVD technology MPEG-2 suffered due to unavailability of software. Future prospects for 
availability of content for these players were also bleak. This preempted the introduction of products 
based on Philips‟ DVD technology later on that were based on its own previous DVD technology. To 
revert back to basics proved to be harder than expected because regaining technical abilities included 
building plants and incurring other prohibitively high costs. Philips‟s case was also unique because the 
company‟s own technologies (e.g. V2000 for videos and MPEG-2 for DVDs) found no support in the 
market and were largely unsuccessful. Therefore, in such cases, many firms have no choice but to buy 
products from overseas manufacturers in order to remain in the industry.   
Information contained in our sources seems to indicate that most CE firms were similarly faced 
with few choices: to either exit the product line(s) because sales were dropping or to go abroad like 
their rivals were doing and lower costs. It is unclear as to whether or not these firms and others lacked 
foresight. Based upon patterns in our data, it appears as though it started off as one decision, which led 
to an increasing dependence on suppliers, as our model proposes. These firms progressed through the 
stages of the model as they faced pressures to meet demand, lower prices, etc. Thus, the increasing 
outsourcing relationships and their outcomes were the culmination of this gradual process. Upon the 
sale of Philips‟ Greenville TV plant (Tennessee, U.S.) in mid 1997, Philips Sound & Vision Chairman-
CEO Doug Dunn said it was “a tough decision, I don‟t take any joy in selling or closing down assets” 
(TV Digest 1997b, p. 14).  
Firms do not need to go through all stages of this cycle for its effects to become visible.  
Sometimes they do not use offshore subsidiaries but instead opt to go straight for outside suppliers 
from abroad. Emerson Radio at some point in time looked to nearby Canada and Latin America to set 
up subsidiaries but it eventually relied mainly on external Asian suppliers for its components and 
finished products. Emerson Radio only went through two of the stages of the cycle and much faster 
than the other two firms. This was probably due to the market it faced in the United States, which was 
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severely competitive. Philips, on the other hand, appears to have gone through the first three stages and 
never really got back to being a technological leader in CE. It would be interesting to observe what 
pattern other CE firms have followed. Furthermore, one might expect firms in other industries, where 
international competition has emerged later than in CE, to show a similar pattern at some point in the 
future. 
From a decision-maker‟s viewpoint the vicious outsourcing cycle is more than just a cause for 
cautionary behavior.  It provides managers with an important criterion for future outsourcing decisions:  
To what extent does the activity that we are considering to outsource embody competences that matter 
for our future growth and innovation potential?  And are we sure that the competences contained in 
this activity are all easily observable? This criterion does not need to replace more traditional 
considerations of cost minimization or those that are based on comparisons between the firm‟s current 
resource stock and that of its potential suppliers, but is a useful supplement to such considerations. In 
addition to short-term considerations firms and their managers also need to think about long-term 
variables such as future growth, continued innovation and sustainability of competitive advantage, all 
three of which are inextricably linked together. There is no a priori correct answer to the question 
whether outsourcing is good or bad for the development of competences inside the firm.  Its 
consequences hinge on the circumstances under which outsourcing takes place and how these 
conditions then change over time. 
In technologically intensive industries such as CE, continued innovation is the key to future 
growth and sustainability of competitive advantage. But in order to innovate, firms need to learn to 
identify those competences that underlie components and could possibly lead to the development of 
unanticipated technology or products in the future. The ability for identification is often elusive or is 
sometimes sacrificed by myopic managers and managers suffering from the Faustian dilemma we 
discussed. Managers need to tell themselves not to think in terms of „just one more component‟ to be 
outsourced. The three firms in our sample had the potential to innovate but they started giving it away 
bit by bit. This does not mean that firms should necessarily increase their R&D budget or keep all 
production activities in-house. But it calls for more judicious outsourcing strategies. Some firms have 
recognized this need, for example, Sony, which has shifted some of its manufacturing for 
semiconductors back in-house. Semiconductors, used in almost all electronic equipment today, are the 
basis for future innovation and being knowledgeable about the process for making semiconductors 
should ideally enable Sony to sustain its technological capabilities. Another important step forward 
seems to be the ability to move from one type of product to the next.  Emerson never really made it 
beyond the radio and started losing out when it missed out on the DVD revolution. So firms that 
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outsource need to think about how they can proceed to entirely new products without having 
productive capacity. That may require different forms of cooperation in the research and development 
stage, for instance with specialist manufacturing outsourcing companies such as Flextronics, which 
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Stage 1 Offshore sourcing by setting up a foreign subsidiary 
Stage 2 Phasing out of foreign subsidiary to independent operators 
Stage 3 Increasing dependence on suppliers leading to less value appropriation 

















Figure 1.  The Outsourcing Cycle 
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1
 Although our model includes an „offshoring‟ stage, which refers to the transfer of activities across geographical borders 
but inside a firm, we almost exclusively discuss the „outsourcing‟ stage that follows it because it involves activities that are 
both transferred across geographical borders and performed by outside suppliers and hence is the more complex issue. 
2
 In 1970, NUC charged its Japanese competitors with attempting to drive U.S. TV makers out of the domestic market by 
dumping or selling foreign made televisions at artificially low prices. This was one of the most controversial disputes in the 
industry at the time and the largest antitrust case again Japanese competitors. But in 1981, a federal court judge ruled that 
NUC and Zenith had been unable to provide sufficient evidence to support their charges. 
3
 Matsushita also acquired Philips‟s main U.S. subsidiary Magnavox in 1992. 
4
 U.S.-based Solectron is one of the world‟s fastest growing electronics manufacturing services (EMS) provider. Its 
offerings include product design and manufacturing.   
5
 This term is courtesy to one of our reviewers‟ suggestions. 
